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BRINGING THE "OPENING THE DOOR" THEORY
TO A CLOSE: THE TENDENCY TO OVERLOOK
THE SPECIFIC CONTRADICTION DOCTRINE IN
EVIDENCE LAW
Francis A. Gilligan* & Edward J. Imwinkelried**
"I believe that truth has only one face: that of...
contradiction."
-George Bataille, French novelist1
The United States is committed to the adversary mode of
litigation.2 In this system, each party possesses the right to
present favorable evidence supporting his position as well as
the right to rebut or attack unfavorable evidence adduced by
the opponent.3 At the heart of the adversary system is a
Hegelian dialectic.4  It is true that Hegel developed his
dialectic as a conception of the historical process, but
apologists for the adversary system have converted it into a
model for dispute resolution. If the party's opponent has the
burden on an issue, the opponent presents his or her thesis,
the party then submits the antithesis, and the truth-a
synthesis-emerges from the clash between the thesis and
* J.D., State University of New York, at Buffalo School of Law; LL.M.,
George Washington University; S.J.D., George Washington University; B.S.,
Alfred University. The author is the Senior Legal Advisor to Chief Judge
Crawford, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
** J.D., University of San Francisco; B.A., University of San Francisco.
The author is Professor of Law, University of California, at Davis.
1. THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 183 (Robert Andrews ed.,
1993).
2. See generally MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM (1975); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE
AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988).
3. See LANDSMAN, supra note 2, at 3-5.
4. See WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILISOPHY 295 (1961).
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antithesis.' To prevent the trier of fact from accepting false
or misleading unfavorable evidence, a party must have the
right to expose the weakness of the opponent's evidence. On
several occasions, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the
constitutional dimension of the right to present favorable
evidence.' Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the
constitutional entitlement includes a party's right to present
testimony attacking unfavorable evidence. In Crane v.
Kentucky,7 the Court found constitutional error when a trial
judge excluded relevant evidence proffered by the accused to
attack the prosecution's testimony about the accused's alleged
confession.
Given the adversarial nature of litigation, it should come
as no surprise that our evidence law has long recognized
specific contradiction as a method of impeachment.8 If an
opposing party calls a witness who testifies to fact A that the
traffic light was red, a party may impeach the former witness
by calling another witness to give contradictory testimony
about non-A that the light was green.9 If the jury believes the
second witness, they have inferred that the opponent's
witness "has erred about or falsified [the] facts."' °
Understood in this sense, recognizing the entitlement to
specific contradiction impeachment is essential to the proper
functioning of an effective adversary system of litigation. In
the final analysis, the entitlement is a corollary of the party's
fundamental right in an adversary system to attack false or
misleading unfavorable evidence presented by the opponent.
Despite the importance of specific contradiction
impeachment, the courts have overlooked the application of
the doctrine in a growing number of cases. To some extent
that tendency is understandable. Article VI of the Federal
Rules of Evidence expressly codifies some impeachment
5. See id. at 295-96; 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 443-46 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967).
6. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284 (1973); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M. GARLAND,
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE: THE ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INTRODUCE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE 15-65 (2d ed. 1996).
7. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
8. See United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1995)
("Impeachment by contradiction is a recognized mode of impeachment.").
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techniques, such as proof of a witness's character trait for
untruthfulness" or prior inconsistent statement, 2 but makes
no mention of the specific contradiction doctrine." Since the
courts do not see any mention of specific contradiction in the
statutory text of Article VI, the operative psychological
dynamic may be "out of sight, out of mind," leading the courts
to lose sight of the doctrine when they analyze rebuttal and
impeachment problems.
While understandable, forgetting the specific
contradiction doctrine is dangerous. As we shall see, in a
number of cases in which the courts have overlooked specific
contradiction, the courts have articulated a vague "opening
the door" theory rather than relying upon the specific
contradiction doctrine. Other opinions equate the expression,
"opening the door," with the curative admissibility doctrine,
while still other opinions use the expression to describe both
specific contradiction and curative admissibility.
Specific contradiction and curative admissibility differ
radically. Curative admissibility is triggered only when the
opponent first breaches an evidentiary rule by introducing
inadmissible evidence. 4 No such limitation curbs the party's
right to resort to the specific contradiction doctrine. It is
critical that the courts do not confuse curative admissibility
and specific contradiction impeachment if these doctrines are
to serve their distinct purposes. For instance, if a court
confuses the doctrines and mistakenly applies the
requirement that the opponent must first breach an
evidentiary rule in a specific contradiction case, the party
could be denied a fair right to rebuttal.
11. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
12. See id. at 613.
13. See id. at art. VI.
14. See Ryan v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 96 F.3d 1076, 1082 n.1 (8th Cir.
1996) (stating "a court may permit the opponent to introduce similarly
inadmissible evidence in rebuttal. . . ."); United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52,
60 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that one condition of the curative admissibility
doctrine is that the opponent has already introduced inadmissible evidence on
the issue); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 187 (3d
Cir. 1993) (the trial judge erred in permitting the prosecution to rely on the
curative admissibility doctrine; the defense had not introduced any
inadmissible evidence); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1225 (2d Cir. 1992)
("The concept of 'opening the door,' or 'curative admissibility,' gives the trial
court discretion to permit a party to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence
on an issue ... when the opposing party has introduced inadmissible evidence
on the same issue.").
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The thesis of this article is that the tendency to confuse
the doctrines should be arrested by recognizing a clear
boundary between specific contradiction and several related
doctrines. Section I describes the specific contradiction
doctrine under common law and the Federal Rules of
Evidence." Section II critiques a number of recent federal
and state decisions.'6 In these decisions, the courts relied on
colorfully entitled, vague theories such as "opening the door"
instead of invoking the specific contradiction doctrine.
Section III details the dangers posed by the mounting
confusion in the recent cases.'7 Section III outlines the key
differences between the specific contradiction doctrine and
related doctrines, notably curative admissibility." This
article argues that the courts should: (1) abandon such vague
terminology as "opening the door" and (2) enforce the
distinctions between specific contradiction and curative
admissibility.
I. THE SPECIFIC CONTRADICTION DOCTRINE
A. At Common Law
At common law, it is well settled that a party may attack
an opposing witness's credibility by offering testimony
contradicting the witness's testimony."' Specific contradiction
has a twofold impeachment value. If the second witness's
testimony is accurate, the first witness is necessarily either
mistaken or lying in that respect." Moreover, "[t]hat showing
should be considered negatively in weighing other
statement[s] by" the first witness.2' In some jurisdictions, the
pattern jury instructions explicitly state that "[a] witness
false in one part of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in
others."22 Hence, the second witness's testimony impeaches
both the first witness's contradictory testimony and the prior
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§§ 1000-1007 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
20. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9.
21. Id.
22. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 2.22 (8th ed. 1994).
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witness's testimony about other disputed issues in the case.
Despite the probative value of specific contradiction
evidence, the common law courts have imposed restrictions
on such evidence. The foremost restriction is the collateral
fact rule. Returning to our example of a trial involving a
traffic accident as a key event, suppose that while testifying
about the critical fact of the color of the traffic light, the
opponent's witness mentions in passing what he was wearing
the day of the accident. The party discovers a second witness
prepared to testify that the witness was dressed differently
that day. On the one hand, the second witness's testimony
has some minimal impeachment value: if the first witness is
mistaken about the clothing he was wearing at the time,
there is some reason to question the caliber of his memory.
On the other hand, "to allow a prolonged dispute about such
extraneous, 'collateral' facts as... the witness's clothing by
allowing the attacker to call other witnesses to disprove
them, is impractical. Dangers of confusion of the jury[] and
waste of time are apparent."3 To reduce these dangers, the
restriction emerged that the party could not call a second
witness to contradict the prior witness on a collateral fact. If
relevant to the merits of the case, extrinsic, contradicting
testimony is admissible; but if the contradicting testimony is
relevant solely to the witness's credibility, extrinsic24
contradiction is barred.25
B. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
Although the specific contradiction doctrine is a fixture in
the common law of impeachment, the Federal Rules of
Evidence fail to even mention the doctrine. The question
thus arises as to whether a party may employ specific
contradiction impeachment under the Federal Rules.
This question has been answered in the affirmative.
Article VI says nothing about specific contradiction
impeachment or about the propriety of bias impeachment.26
23. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9.
24. In this context, "extrinsic" denotes evidence presented after the witness
to be impeached has left the stand. Thus, the extrinsic evidence limitation
would bar either later contradictory testimony by another witness or the
subsequent introduction of a contradictory writing prepared by another person.
25. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9.
26. But see FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee's note 4 (referring to the
"bias or prejudice of a witness"). There is no mention of this rule in United
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The Supreme Court confronted the question of whether a
party may utilize bias impeachment in federal practice in
United States v. Abel.27 The Abel Court ruled that as at
common law, proof of a witness's bias remains a viable
impeachment technique. 8 The Court reasoned that it was
unnecessary to find an express statutory authorization for
bias impeachment in Article VI.29 Instead, the Court looked
to Article IV dealing with relevance." Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist declared:
Rule 401 defines as "relevant evidence" evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the United
States Constitution, by Act of Congress, or by applicable
rule. A successful showing of bias on the part of a witness
would have a tendency to make the facts to which he
testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it would
31be without such testimony.
In other words, since bias evidence is relevant, Rule 402 was
the only statutory authorization needed to justify the
continued recognition of the bias impeachment technique.
The Court's holding was sound. The inclusion of Article
VI, touching on impeachment, in the Federal Rules indicates
that a witness's credibility is a fact of consequence. Common
sense and logic suggest that a witness's bias is relevant to the
question of the witness's credibility." A bias might prompt a
witness to lie and could operate at a subconscious level,
distorting "every bit" of a witness's testimony.3 3
If bias impeachment is still permissible under the
Federal Rules even absent an express statutory
authorization, a fortiori specific contradiction impeachment is
allowable. Like proof of a witness's bias, testimony
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
27. 469 U.S. 45.
28. See id. at 51.
29. See id. at 50.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 50-51.
32. See John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Karen S. Czapanskiy, Bias Impeachment
and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 GEO. L.J. 257 (1972).
33. See United States v. Hively, 547 F. Supp. 318, 320 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
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specifically contradicting the witness's version of the facts
calls into question the witness's credibility.34 Although the
Supreme Court has never squarely held that the specific
contradiction doctrine survived the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, with Abel as the benchmark, the lower
courts have uniformly concluded that the doctrine remains
good law.35  Hence, if the party's testimony contradicts
evidence already introduced by the opponent, under Rule 402
the party has a presumptive right to present the
contradictory testimony. In this regard, the party's rights
under the Federal Rules are similar to his or her entitlement
at common law. However, the conclusion that the specific
contradiction doctrine survived the enactment of the Federal
Rules does not end the analysis.
Like the specific contradiction doctrine, did the collateral
fact limitation on the doctrine survive?36 Without using the
term "collateral," Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) codifies one
aspect of the common-law limitation. Rule 608(b) authorizes
a cross-examiner to question the witness about untruthful or
deceitful acts even when they have not as yet resulted in a
conviction.37 Yet, if the witness denies the act, the statute
forbids the cross-examiner from later introducing extrinsic
evidence to contradict the denial. In the words of Rule 608(b),
the witness's commission of the act "may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence."38 The party must "take the answer" the
witness gives on cross-examination. 9
With the exception of Rule 608(b) and a passing reference
to "collateral" in Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
devoted to the best evidence rule, 0 the Federal Rules do not
34. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9.
35. See United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1995);
United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1409 (D.C.Cir. 1988); United States
v. Welker, 44 M.J. 85 (C.A.A.F. 1996); The Federal Common Law of 'Specific
Contradiction,' FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE NEWS 90-59 (John R. Schmertz,
Jr. ed., 1990).
36. See United States v. Lambert, 463 F.2d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[Tlhe
general rule is that a witness may not be impeached by contradiction as to
collateral or irrelevant matters elicited on cross-examination.").
37. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
38. Id.
39. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 49.
40. FED. R. EVID. 1004(4) (referring to the subdivision entitled "Collateral
Matters"). The provision has nothing to do with impeachment or rebuttal. The
provision relates to a situation in which there is no need to comply with the best
evidence rule. Under this provision, a party may introduce otherwise
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refer to the collateral fact rule. That silence effectively
abolishes the common law collateral fact doctrine as a rigid
limitation on the specific contradiction doctrine. As
previously stated, Federal Rule of Evidence 402 states that
logically relevant evidence is admissible unless it may be
excluded under the Constitution, Act of Congress, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, or other court rules adopted pursuant to
statutory authority such as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.41 The common law collateral fact doctrine is a
creature of case law. The statutory scheme of the Federal
Rules abolishes uncodified exclusionary rules of evidence.4"
What remains is Rule 403,4' allowing the trial judge
discretion to exclude relevant evidence when he concludes
that the incidental probative dangers, such as the risk of
confusion or time consumption, substantially outweigh the
probative worth of the evidence.4 Thus, the Federal Rules
yield the same outcome as the California Evidence Code. In
the official comment to section 780 of the California Evidence
Code, the California Law Revision Commission stated that:
The effect of [that statutory scheme] is to eliminate this
inflexible rule of exclusion. This is not to say that all
evidence of a collateral nature offered to attack the
credibility of a witness would be admissible. Under
Section 352 [the California analogue to Federal Rule 403],
the court has substantial discretion to exclude collateral
evidence. The effect of [these statutes], therefore, is to
change the present somewhat inflexible rule of exclusion
to a rule of discretion to be exercised by the trial judge.45
Thus, while there is no hard and fast rule barring
inadmissible secondary evidence of a writing's contents when "[tihe writing,
recording, or photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue." Id.
41. See id. at 402.
42. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); United
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1993). In both cases, the Court approvingly quoted
an article by the late Professor Edward Cleary who had served as the Reporter
for the Advisory Committee which drafted the Federal Rules. In the article,
Professor Cleary stated that after the enactment of the Rules, "[iun principle,
under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains." See also Edward
J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV.
LITIG. 129 (1987).
43. FED. R. EVID. 403.
44. See United States v. Turner, 39 M.J. 259, 266 (C.M.A. 1994) (Crawford,
J., concurring).
45. CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 780, Law Revision Comm'n comment (Edward
J. Imwinkelried & Tim Hallahan eds., West 2001).
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impeachment on collateral facts, in an extreme case the trial
judge retains a residual discretion to exclude extrinsic
evidence proffered for that purpose.
The federal trial judge enjoys similar discretion.
However, his or her discretion under Rule 403 is limited in
two respects. First, the Rule specifies the factors which the
judge may consider in making his or her discretionary
determination: "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."46  The accompanying Advisory
Committee Note indicates that the list of factors is
exhaustive. The Note asserts that while some common law
cases suggested that a trial judge could exercise the
discretion to exclude evidence on the basis of unfair surprise,
the omission of any mention of that basis in the text of Rule
403 deprives federal trial judges of the power to exclude for
that reason.47
Second, Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant
evidence.48  The wording and legislative history49 set the
burden of persuasion on the party opposing the admission of
logically relevant evidence. Once the proponent of the
evidence demonstrates its logical relevance, the opponent
bears the burden of persuading the trial judge that by a wide
margin, the attendant probative dangers outstrip the
probative value of the evidence. The cases teach that trial
judges ought to use Rule 403 sparingly.0 Judges should
rarely exclude evidence with substantial probative value."
The judge's discretion is a narrow, circumscribed authority,
not a broad license to bar relevant evidence. Thus, although
the trial judge may sometimes invoke Rule 403 to override a
party's presumptive right to introduce specific contradiction
46. FED. R. EVID. 403.
47. See id. advisory committee's note.
48. See United States v. Rivera, 83 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1996).
49. See 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE §
8:28 (rev. ed. 1999).
50. See United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied
sub nom.; Powers v. United States, 528 U.S. 945 (1999); United States v.
$9,041,598.68, 163 F.3d 238, 254 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom.; Massieu
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1023 (1999); Rivera, 83 F.3d at 546; United States v.
Morris, 79 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Pretel, 939 F.2d 233,
239 (5th Cir. 1991); Koch v. Koch Indus., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1385 (D. Kan. 1998).
51. See United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436, 444 (1st Cir. 1995).
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evidence, the exclusion of such evidence should not be a
common occurrence.
II. THE GROWING CONFUSION IN THE CASES
Although the specific contradiction doctrine survived the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, there has been a
disturbing judicial tendency to blur the doctrine. The
confusion has manifested itself in two ways. First, the courts
have disregarded the specific contradiction doctrine. Second,
the courts have exacerbated the situation by using the
expression "opening the door" as a synonym for specific
contradiction or curative admissibility, or a general umbrella
covering both specific contradiction and curative
admissibility.
A. Negatively Overlooking Specific Contradiction
In the 1990s, a clear and disturbing trend to overlook the
specific contradiction doctrine became evident in both federal
and state decisions.
Consider the decision by the United States Court of
Military Appeals" in United States v. Turner in 1994."3 The
accused, Turner, was a Technical Sergeant on active duty
with the United States Air Force. Turner was convicted of
larceny of oscilloscopes from his place of work.
During the opening statement, the defense counsel stated
that Turner had voluntarily turned over the oscilloscope in
question:
So Sergeant Turner just put the item on a shelf at his
home and waited for the OSI [Office of Special
Investigations] to contact him. Although the OSI waited
several months to contact Sergeant Turner, he did,
voluntarily, surrender the item and make a written
statement to Special Agent Gardner as to what happened;
and you will have his written statement before you as to
what happened.54
The defense counsel's statement clearly implied that
Turner had cooperated with the O.S.I. agent and voluntarily
52. The court has been renamed the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces. One of the authors, Mr. Gilligan, currently serves as a clerk to
the court.
53. 39 M.J. 259 (C.M.A. 1994).
54. Id. at 260.
816 [Vol. 41
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surrendered the item. In effect, the defense offered
"consciousness of innocence"55 evidence and argued that
Turner had acted as if he had nothing to hide. To rebut the
implication, the prosecution attempted to introduce the
agent's testimony that when the agent requested Turner's
permission to search his house, Turner balked.56
The majority of the court ruled that the agent's testimony
was inadmissible. The majority noted that the defense
counsel's statement was "nothing more than a single passing
comment during defense counsel's opening statement."7 The
majority added that technically, statements in opening do not
constitute evidence. 8
However, neither the majority nor the concurring judge
were content to rest their analysis solely on the formal non-
evidentiary status of statements during opening. Assuming
that the statements should be treated in the same manner as
evidence, both the majority and the concurring judge felt
compelled to discuss the admissibility of the prosecution
evidence. The majority insisted that the defense counsel's
statement did not "open the door" to the prosecution
evidence.59 The majority reasoned that Turner's refusal to
authorize a search of his house had "no arguable relevance at
all to whether his return of the property was voluntary." °
Although the concurrence disputed the majority's
conclusion that the prosecution evidence lacked relevance,
the concurrence also invoked the "opening the door"
doctrine.6' Unlike the majority, however, the concurrence
acknowledged the applicability of the specific contradiction
doctrine. The concurrence stated that it would promote "the
proper functioning of the adversary system" to admit the
prosecution evidence, since it tended to "squarely contradict"
the implication from the defense statement." The
concurrence faulted the majority for overlooking "the common
law rule of contradiction."63
55. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 49, § 10:41.
56. See Turner, 39 M.J. at 261.
57. Id. at 262.
58. See id. at 262-63.
59. See id. at 262.
60. Id. at 263-64.
61. See id. at 267 (Crawford, J., concurring).
62. See Turner, 39 M.J. at 267.
63. Id.
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The judicial tendency to ignore the specific contradiction
doctrine is evident in federal civilian decisions as well as
federal military opinions. One of the most recent cases in
point is a 2000 decision rendered by the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, United States v. Beason.64 In Beason, the
defense sought to take advantage of the Bruton rule. Under
the Bruton rule, in a joint trial of co-defendants A and B, A's
confession implicating B is inadmissible if: (1) A's confession
does not qualify as a vicarious admission against B;6  and (2)
A elects not to testify at the trial.66 To be sure, the confession
would otherwise qualify as a personal admission against A.67
Typically, when evidence is admissible against one co-
defendant but not another, the trial judge admits the
evidence with a limiting instruction.6" However, a limiting
instruction forbidding the jury from using A's confession as
evidence against B would be inadequate. Since the passage
inculpating B is directly relevant to a key issue in the case
and A was in a position to have personal knowledge, at least
at a subconscious level the jurors would be tempted to
disregard the instruction and treat the passage as evidence
against B. That treatment makes A a functional accuser of B.
If A is one of B's accusers, B has the right to confront and
cross-examine A. However, since A elects against testifying,
co-defendant B cannot cross-examine A to test the statements
incriminating B.
In Beason, the Government introduced evidence that
Beason was a drug kingpin selling from his truck and hiding
hundreds of thousands of dollars in its inside compartments.69
Like most drug kingpins, he used runners, one of whom was
named Washington.7" Washington did not testify at Beason's
trial.7' During the trial, the defense cross-examined an F.B.I.
agent who had taken a statement from Washington." When
the defense asked whether the information concerning money
64. 220 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2000).
65. For example, A might have made the statement after his or her arrest.
If so, in most cases, A would not be considered an active member of the
conspiracy. See United States v. Sandoval-Curiel, 50 F.3d 1389 (7th Cir. 1995).
66. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
67. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
68. See id. at 105.
69. See United States v. Beason, 220 F.3d 964, 966-67 (8th Cir. 2000).
70. See id. at 965.
71. See id. at 967.
72. See id.
818 [Vol. 41
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hidden in Beason's truck had come from Beason directly, the
agent admitted that it had not.7" The defense then asked
whether Washington, who had a prior drug arrest, supplied
the information.74 The trial judge accepted the Government's
argument that the latter question opened the door for the
agent to testify about Washington's statement identifying
Beason as the source of the money hidden in the truck."
On appeal, the accused argued that admitting
Washington's statement was a Bruton error." "The
government concede[d] that because Washington did not
testify at trial, such testimony would ordinarily be
inadmissible under Bruton."77  Despite the government's
concession, the appellate court upheld the introduction of the
statement.' The court reasoned:
Beason's theory of defense at trial was that Washington
orchestrated the events in question, while Beason was an
unknowing bystander. We find defense counsel's
questioning, stressing not only that information regarding
the hidden currency did not come from Beason, but also
that it came from Washington, an individual with a prior
drug record, did more than simply dispel an assumption
that Beason provided the information. It could have
created a misleading impression that Washington was the
"bad guy"....79
Like the majority opinion in Turner, the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Beason disregarded the specific contradiction
doctrine. In Beason, the court also resorted to colorful, vague
language, using the "opened the door" expression. ° The
expression appears six times in the course of a relatively
short opinion.8 To support its decision, the court cited 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s opinions relying on the "opening the door"
rubric." The court never mentions the specific contradiction
doctrine.
The failure to invoke the specific contradiction doctrine is
73. See id. at 968.
74. See id.
75. See Beason, 220 F.3d at 968.
76. See id. at 966.
77. Id. at 967.
78. See id. at 968.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 967.
81. See Beason, 220 F.3d at 967-68.
82. See id. at 968.
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particularly troubling in these cases because they are specific
contradiction fact situations rather than curative
admissibility problems. In Turner, the defense informed the
jury that the accused had cooperated by voluntarily returning
an oscilloscope. In Beason, the defense introduced evidence
about Washington's arrest to raise doubts about his bias and
the trustworthiness of the information he provided to the
police. In both cases, the defense "evidence" was admissible.
Evidence of the accused's cooperation with the police is
admissible as proof of his or her "consciousness of
innocence."83 Likewise, under Abel, the defense has a right to
introduce evidence establishing a relevant bias. The defense
information may have been misleading or even false, but it
was not inadmissible. The federal courts should have applied
the specific contradiction doctrine to these fact patterns.
In Jackson v. State,84 the state court held that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting the
prosecutor to ask the accused whether he loved his wife every
day of the marriage.85 Jackson testified that he had loved his
wife every day throughout their twenty-one years of
marriage, including the day she was shot.8" Jackson
contended that the killing of his wife was an accident. Over
a defense objection, the trial judge allowed the prosecution to
introduce evidence of his assault and battery against his wife
two years prior to the shooting."
The court acknowledged that given the defense claim of
accident, the evidence could have been admitted to show
"absence of mistake or accident" consistent with the terms of
the Indiana version of Federal Rule 404(b). 9 However, the
court added an alternative basis for its decision: the accused
had "opened the door" to the prosecution evidence. ° The
83. United States v. Reifsteck, 841 F.2d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1988). See also
United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 690 (2d Cir. 1990).
84. 728 N.E.2d 147 (Ind. 2000).
85. See id. at 155.
86. See id. at 151.
87. See id. at 150.
88. See id. at 151.
89. See id. at 151-52. The court quoted the statutory language that,
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith ... [but]
may, however, be admissible [to prove] motive, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
90. See Jackson, 728 N.E.2d at 152.
820 [Vol. 41
2001] SPECIFIC CONTRADICTION DOCTRINE 821
court used the expression three times in its opinion,9 but
never alluded to the specific contradiction theory. Just as in
the federal cases, the court failed to turn to the specific
contradiction doctrine. The record does not indicate that the
defense overreached the character evidence rules by offering
a sweeping denial by the accused that he had never struck or
attacked his wife.92 Simply stated, the prosecution had a
right to specifically contradict the accused's testimony to
correct a false or misleading impression created by the
testimony." Reliance on the vague "opening the door" theory
was wholly unnecessary.
B. Affirmatively Using the Vague "Opening the Door" Theory
as a Synonym for Curative Admissibility or a General
Umbrella
The previous section analyzed a number of judicial
opinions which previously would have analyzed the facts
under the specific contradiction doctrine.94 Unfortunately, the
opinions do not mention the specific contradiction doctrine
but instead refer to an "opening the door" theory. If these
cases merely renamed the specific contradiction doctrine,
they would be relatively unobjectionable. In several respects,
evidentiary terminology under the Federal Rules differs from
the common law evidentiary lexicon. For instance, at
common law, if the opponent offers evidence probative of a
fact not within the range of issues framed by the pleadings,
the party may object that the evidence is "immaterial."95
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, the objection would be
"irrelevant."9 Another change in nomenclature occurs in the
hearsay doctrine. At common law, admissions of a party-
opponent were deemed to fall within a hearsay exception. 7
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), admissions are
91. See id. at 152 n.3.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1011 (2d Cir. 1990), where the Second Circuit
court held that "a defendant may not seek to establish his innocence
through proof of the absence of criminal acts on specific occasions.").
93. See Jackson, 728 N.E.2d at 152.
94. See supra Part H.A.
95. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§§ 303-304 (3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE].
96. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
97. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 254.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
classified as nonhearsay.98
However, it does not appear that these opinions reflect a
conscious judicial decision to simply change the name of an
evidentiary doctrine. The courts are not merely treating
"opening the door" as a new designation for the traditional
specific contradiction doctrine. Quite to the contrary, in one
federal case, United States v. Whitworth," the court equated
"opening the door" with curative admissibility. The court
referred to "the rule of curative admissibility, or the 'opening
the door' doctrine.""' Similarly, United States v. Rea'
alluded to "[t]he concept of 'opening the door,' or 'curative
admissibility."' One commentator has suggested that a party
may invoke curative admissibility precisely because the
opponent has "opened the door."' °
To complicate matters further, rather than equating
"opening the door" with either curative admissibility or
specific contradiction, other courts treat "opening the door" as
a broader theory encompassing both specific contradiction
and curative admissibility. In Lala v. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co. ,"o3 an Iowa court used the phrase, "opening the door," to
subsume both specific contradiction and curative
admissibility. Lala brought suit against a bank for the
unauthorized removal of certain stamps from a safety deposit
box."" The bank claimed that Lala did not own the stamps
and contended that the true owner was a gentleman named
Sels. '°5 Lala testified during the plaintiffs case-in-chief but
was forced to admit on cross-examination that he had sued
Sels over an unrelated land contract transaction.10 6 During
the plaintiffs rebuttal case, Lala "introduced evidence, over
the Bank's objection that the separate law suit had been
dismissed and Lala had been paid $75,000 in settlement.' 17
The appellate court sustained the trial judge's decision to
98. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). The doctrine is therefore an exemption
from the hearsay definition rather than an exception to the hearsay rule.
99. 856 F.2d 1268, 1285 (9th Cir. 1988).
100. Id. at 1285.
101. 958 F.2d 1206, 1225 (2d Cir. 1992).
102. See Comment, Evidence-Curative Admissibility in Missouri, 32 MO. L.
REV. 505, 505-08 (1967).
103. 420 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1988).
104. See id. at 806.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 807.
107. Id.
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overrule the objection. °8
The court relied on the curative admissibility doctrine in
part. The court characterized the "evidence of the unrelated
law suit" as "irrelevant" and consequently inadmissible.0 9
Expressly citing the curative admissibility doctrine,"' the
court remarked that its holding "illustrate[d] the risks
involved when a party offers evidence of questionable
relevancy.""'
If the court had confined its comments to curative
admissibility, the opinion would be an unexceptional
application of that doctrine. However, the court did not stop
there. The court also accepted Lala's contention that "the
Bank had opened the door by offering evidence of the
separate law suit.""' Since the court mentioned "opening the
door" as an alternative to curative admissibility, the court
cannot be said to have been specifically equating the "opening
the door" theory with the curative admissibility doctrine.
Since the trigger in Lala was the opponent's introduction of
inadmissible evidence, the court could also not have been
treating the theory as another title for specific contradiction.
The Lala court appeared to treat "opening the door" as a more
general theory, encompassing both curative admissibility and
specific contradiction. That treatment of the theory invites
further confusion over the boundary between specific
contradiction and curative admissibility.
III. THE DANGER POSED BY THE GROWING CONFUSION
We have seen that in several cases the courts could have
relied on the specific contradiction doctrine but either
intentionally or inadvertently overlooked that doctrine.
Instead, they resorted to the vague expression "opening the
door," sometimes equated with the curative admissibility
doctrine or with specific contradiction."3 Although the use of
such vague and colorful expressions as "opening the door" and
"fighting fire with fire" adds more flavor to judicial opinions,
the unnecessary reliance on those expressions risks confusing
108. See id. at 808.
109. Lala, 420 N.W.2d at 807-08.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 808.
112. Id. at 807.
113. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 57.
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the specific contradiction and curative admissibility
doctrines.' The courts ought to eschew such expressions and
draw a sharp boundary between specific contradiction and
curative admissibility. This boundary should include at least
six distinctions between the doctrines. Three of these
distinctions relate to the prima facie case for invoking the
doctrine while the remaining three distinctions concern the
nature and extent of the discretion which the trial judge
wields in applying the doctrine.
A. Distinctions Relating to the Prima Facie Case for
Invoking the Doctrine
1. The Trigger for Curative Admissibility: The
Opponent's Presentation of Inadmissible Evidence
A party may resort to specific contradiction impeachment
so long as his or her testimony contradicts evidence
introduced earlier by the opponent. This impeachment
technique is not confined to situations in which, in retrospect,
it is clear that the evidence introduced by the opponent was
inadmissible.'15 Although a party may contend that an
opponent's evidence is false or misleading, even false or
potentially misleading evidence can satisfy the rules
governing the admissibility of evidence."'
In contrast, the prevailing view is that a party may
invoke curative admissibility only when earlier in the same
trial the opponent succeeded in introducing inadmissible
evidence."7 The courts have explicitly noted this limitation
on the scope of the curative admissibility doctrine. In Lala v.
114. See Daniel P. Maguire, Curative Admissibility: Fighting Fire with Fire,
23 COLO. LAW. 2321 (1994).
115. See James W. McElhaney, Opening the Door, 12 LITIG. 48 (1985)
("Scholars talk about curative admissibility when illegal evidence triggers the
admissibility of other illegal evidence. But the law is filled with situations
where perfectly legal evidence opens the door to a rebuttal that would otherwise
not be available.").
116. Indeed, requiring the judge to pass on the truth of testimony as part of
the admissibility analysis would undermine the jurors' role as triers of fact.
According to Coke's famous maxim, "Ad questionem facti non respondent
judices" (judges do not decide questions of fact). See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 185-87 (1898); 9 WIGMORE, supra
note 19, § 2549, at 639-40.
117. See United States v. Nardi, 633 F.2d 972 (1st Cir. 1980); Comment,
supra note 102, at 505-08.
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Peoples Bank & Trust Co. ," the state court declared:
We recognized the doctrine of curative admissibility. This
doctrine provides that when one party introduces
inadmissible evidence, with or without objection, the trial
court may allow the adverse party to offer otherwise
inadmissible evidence on the same subject if it is
responsive to the evidence in question." 9
Federal decisions are in accord with the state decisions. In
a 1999 federal decision, a court refused to permit the
prosecution to rely on the curative admissibility doctrine
because the defense had not introduced any inadmissible
evidence.'
2. The Necessity of Showing the Inadequacy of an
Objection or Motion to Strike as a Remedy for the
Opponent's Presentation of Inadmissible Evidence
In true curative admissibility cases the evidence
introduced earlier by the opponent was inadmissible. Unless
the ground for objection was not apparent at the time, the
party had an option other than later offering contrary
evidence: objecting or moving to strike when the opponent
proffers inadmissible evidence. If the opponent attempts to
inject the inadmissible evidence during the direct
examination of one of his or her witnesses, the party can
object. If the opposing witness gratuitously mentions the
evidence during the party's cross-examination, the party may
move to strike. Before permitting the party to later introduce
other inadmissible evidence on a curative admissibility
theory, the court should inquire whether a contemporaneous
objection or motion would have been a sufficient remedy.
Would a timely objection or motion have adequately protected
the party's interests?
The courts have acknowledged the pertinence of the
party's opportunity to object as a consideration in analyzing
118. 420 N.W.2d 804 (Iowa 1988).
119. Id. at 807-08.
120. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180,
187 (3d Cir. 1993); Nardi, 633 F.2d 972.
121. See United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 256 (3d Cir. 1999), amended
by 197 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 1999) (The doctrine applies when "a party has
introduced inadmissible evidence that may create false impression .... But the
government does not argue that Davis's direct testimony was inadmissible ....
Therefore, this is not a case of curative admissibility.").
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non-evidentiary problems. During the closing argument in
United States v. Robinson,2 ' the defense counsel told the jury
that the government had not allowed the accused to explain
his side of the story and had breached its duty to be fair.'
The judge held a hearing outside the jury's presence on the
prosecution's objection to the argument. 124 At the hearing, the
prosecutor contended that the defense had opened the door.125
The trial court agreed, stating:
I will tell you what, the Fifth Amendment ties the
government's hands in terms of commenting upon the
defendant's failure to testify. But that tying of hands is
not putting you into a boxing match with your hands tied
behind your back and allowing him to punch you in the
face.
That is not what it was intended for and not fair. I will
let you say that the defendants had every opportunity, if
they wanted to, to explain this to the ladies and
gentlemen of the jury.126
The respondent did not object.
Following a short recess, the prosecutor gave his rebuttal
summation. He began by stating that the Government had
an obligation to "play fair" and had complied with that
obligation in this case."7 Specifically, he stated:
[Defense counsel] has made comments to the extent the
Government has not allowed the defendants an
opportunity to explain. It is totally unacceptable.
He explained himself away on tape right into an
indictment. He explained himself to the insurance
investigator, to the extent that he wanted to.
He could have taken the stand and explained it to you,
anything he wanted to. The United States of America has
given him, throughout, the opportunity to explain.128
Defense counsel did not object to this closing and did not
request a cautionary instruction. Nonetheless, the court
included in the jury instruction the admonition that "no
122. 485 U.S. 25 (1988).
123. Id. at 27.




128. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 28.
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inference whatever may be drawn from the election of a
defendant not to testify."
129
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit overturned Robinson's conviction.' Before the
Supreme Court, Robinson pressed the same theory upon
which the Sixth Circuit had relied; he argued that the
prosecutor's rebuttal summation amounted to plain error
violative of the prohibition against comment on an accused's
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, announced in
Griffin v. California.' The majority of the Court rejected
Robinson's argument. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist in the
lead opinion... and Justice Blackmun in his partial
concurrence133 voted to reverse the Sixth Circuit's judgment.
The lead opinion "decline[d] to expand Griffin to preclude a
fair response by the prosecutor in situations such as the
present one."34 In his separate opinion, Justice Blackmun
favored remanding to clarify the application of the plain error
doctrine to the facts of the case.' Both Chief Justice
Rehnquist'36 and Justice Blackmun'37 relied on the Supreme
Court's 1985 decision in United States v. Young.138 In Young,
Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the better remedy is
for the trial judge:
to deal with the improper argument of the defense counsel
promptly and thus blunt the need for the prosecutor to
respond. Arguably defense counsel's misconduct could
have warranted the judge to interrupt the argument and
admonish him,... thereby rendering the prosecutor's
response unnecessary. . . . "Invited responses" can
effectively be discouraged by prompt action from the
bench in the form of corrective instructions to the jury
and, when necessary, in admonition to the errant
advocate.
In another closing argument case, United States v.
129. Id. at 28-29.
130. United States v. Robinson, 716 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1983).
131. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
132. See Robinson, 485 U.S. at 34.
133. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 37.
136. See id. at 29.
137. See id. at 34 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
139. Id. at 13.
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Grady,14° the court indicated that regardless of who initiated
the argument as to command policies, the judge has a sua
sponte duty to issue a curative instruction. When a curative
instruction would be an effective antidote, the party should
move for such an instruction and be content with the
instruction as relief. In some situations, however, the party
might deliberately forego the instruction and seize on the
opponent's error as a pretext for the party's own violation of
closing argument restrictions.
An analysis similar to the one applied in these closing
argument cases has been extended to evidentiary problems
under the curative admissibility doctrine. Since the
opponent's evidence is inadmissible, the party could have
objected or moved to strike. If the court finds that a
sustained objection or granted motion would sufficiently
protect the party's legitimate interests, the court may
conclude that the party's only remedy was "to object when"
the inadmissible evidence is proffered. The party may not
exploit the opponent's violation as "an excuse for further
inquiry" into inadmissible matter. 4' The party "needs no
other protection"' than a fair opportunity to voice an
effective objection.
Of course, the adequacy of a contemporaneous objection
as a remedy depends in large part on the question of whether
the judge believes that realistically, a curative instruction to
the jury to disregard the improper argument would be
effective. Furthermore, the likely effectiveness of instructing
the jury to disregard an opposing party's inadmissible
evidence depends upon how probative the jury is likely to find
the evidence. The 1999 edition of the McCormick treatise
argues:
Consider, for example, a case in which one party
improperly injects evidence of the good character of his
distant relatives who played a minor role in the litigated
event. That type of evidence is unlikely to change the
outcome of the trial; and it would hardly be an abuse of
discretion for the judge to exclude the [party's] evidence
attacking the relative's character. [However, a]ssume
that [the opponent] succeeds in introducing inadmissible
140. 15 M.J. 275 (C.M.A. 1983).
141. See United States v. Duran, 886 F.2d 167, 169 (8th Cir. 1989).
142. Buck v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 185 S.W. 208, 213 (Mo. 1916).
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evidence of his own good character. That evidence is
much more likely to impact the verdict than testimony
about a distant relative's character.
43
The strongest case for invoking curative admissibility
exists when the curative instruction would probably have
been ineffective. However, if the judge concludes that the
jury could have complied with the instruction, that conclusion
cuts strongly against applying curative admissibility.
3. The Trigger for Specific Contradiction: A Flat
Contradiction between the Testimony Previously
Introduced by the Opponent and the Evidence
Proffered by the Party
As Section III.A noted, in one respect the foundation for
invoking the curative admissibility doctrine is more
demanding than the predicate for specific contradiction. The
former doctrine comes into play only when, in retrospect, the
judge concludes that the evidence previously introduced by
the opponent was inadmissible.
In another regard, though, the foundation for specific
contradiction is more rigorous. Review the Lala court's
statement of the curative admissibility doctrine: the court
explained that after the opponent has introduced
inadmissible evidence, the trial judge has discretion to allow
the party to present otherwise inadmissible evidence "on the
same subject"14 or "on the same issue.""' To be sure, the
curative admissibility cases permit the party to introduce
only as much otherwise inadmissible evidence as needed to
counteract the opponent's inadmissible evidence. 4 ' However,
143. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 57, at 254-55. The treatise
cites Fortner v. Bruhn, 31 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1963) (involving a relative's
character), and People v. Matlock, 89 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1970) (involving the
accused's own character).
144. Lala v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 804, 807-08 (Iowa 1988).
See also State v. Tyler, 676 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("about the
same document").
145. See United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1995); United States
v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1225 (2d Cir. 1992).
146. See United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("Opening the door is one thing. What comes through the door is another.
'Introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence under [the] shield of [curative
admissibility] is permitted only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair
prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence."); see
also Forrester, 60 F.3d at 52; Rea, 958 F.2d at 1225 (finding that the trial judge
should admit only the party's evidence "needed to rebut a false impression that
829
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the curative admissibility cases stop short of announcing a
categorical requirement that the party's rebuttal evidence
expressly "contradict" the testimony previously introduced by
the opponent.
In contrast, specific contradiction applies only when a
flat contradiction between the testimony previously
introduced by the opponent and the rebuttal evidence
proffered by the party exists. In the case of prior inconsistent
statement, another impeachment technique, it is sufficient if
the witness's prior statement is "inconsistent" with the
witness's trial testimony.'47 The earlier statement need "only
bend in a different direction" than the trial testimony.""
However, when the party resorts to the instant impeachment
technique, the party's evidence must "squarely"'4" "contradict"
the opponent's testimony."' In contrast to curative
admissibility, it is not enough that the party's evidence
touches on the same subject or issue. The party's evidence
must possess a certain type of relevance to that subject or
issue, namely, outright contradiction of the opponent's
testimony on that subject or issue.
When the party's evidence is so highly relevant that it
flatly contradicts the opponent's testimony, the courts are
highly receptive to the admission of the contradictory
may have resulted from the opposing party's evidence"); United States v. Doe,
656 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that the evidence proffered by the
prosecution would not have served to correct any misleading impression created
by the defense questioning); Tyler, 676 S.W.2d at 925 ("[Ihe state exceeded the
limited application of the doctrine [of curative admissibility] and went into
uninvited areas.").
In the closing argument context, the invited error doctrine is the
counterpart to curative admissibility. See W. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN
LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK § 13.8, at 485 (2d
ed. 2000). Like curative admissibility, invited response permits only a limited
response by the party: "The doctrine is confined to 'defensive, as opposed to
offensive, conduct.' If the opposing party has made an earlier improper
statement in summation, the injured lawyer has a limited right to make
otherwise improper arguments necessary to 'neutralize' the earlier statement."
Id. See also Dortch v. O'Leary, 863 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1988); People v.
Feldmann, 732 N.E.2d 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
147. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 127.
148. J. MCNAUGHT & H. FLANNERY, MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE: A
COURTROOM REFERENCE 13-5 (1988).
149. United States v. Turner, 39 M.J. 259, 267 (C.M.A. 1994) (Crawford, J.,
concurring).
150. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, §§ 45, 49.
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evidence. In decisions such as United States v. Havens,151 the
Supreme Court held that the contradictory evidence is
admissible even though it was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, the probative worth of truly
contradictory evidence is so great that it can lift the bar of
even a constitutional exclusionary rule. The case for invoking
specific contradiction to lift the bar is strongest when the
accused gives the testimony (to be contradicted) on direct
examination by his or her own attorney.5 ' However, as
Havens ruled, the doctrine also comes into play when the
accused gives the testimony on cross-examination so long as
the subject-matter of the question posed on cross-examination
was "reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct
examination."'53
B. The Nature and Extent of the Trial Judge's Discretion in
Applying the Doctrine
1. The Existence of Judicial Discretion to Exclude the
Party's Responsive Evidence
Federal Rule 402 entitles a party to introduce logically
relevant evidence unless the trial judge is authorized to
exclude the evidence under the Constitution, a federal
statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted
pursuant to statutory authority such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."" If the party offers evidence which
specifically contradicts earlier testimony introduced by the
opponent, the party's evidence is logically relevant. Article
VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence reflects that the
credibility of a witness is a fact of consequence, and evidence
specifically contradicting a witness's testimony calls into
question the witness's credibility. The upshot is that by
virtue of the reasoning in United States v. Abel,'55 the party
has a presumptive right to introduce the evidence. If the
evidence did not run afoul of a statutory exclusionary rule
such as hearsay, the only qualification to the party's right
151. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
152. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
153. Havens, 446 U.S. at 627.
154. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
155. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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would be the judge's discretionary power under Rule 403.156
Since specific contradiction evidence is subject to
discretionary exclusion under Rule 403, the party's right is
less than absolute. However, with the exception of
convictions admissible under Rule 609(a)(2),"7 every right to
introduce evidence, recognized under the Federal Rules, is
qualified by Rule 403.'
Does a party relying on curative admissibility have as
strong a claim to a right to introduce the responsive evidence?
That question should be answered in the affirmative at least
in one exceptional situation. If the trial judge received the
opponent's inadmissible evidence over the party's objection,
the McCormick treatise argues that the party ought to have a
right to rebut.9 The treatise reasons:
By objecting [the party] did his best to save the court from
mistake. His remedy of assigning appellate error to the
ruling is inadequate. He needs a fair opportunity to win
his case at the trial level by refuting the damaging
evidence. In many cases, the adversary simply cannot
afford the expense of a second trial after an appeal.' 6'
Of course, in this situation, given the right facts the trialjudge could still exercise his or her discretion to exclude
under Rule 403. However, even the party's presumptive right
156. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
157. See id. at 609(a)(2) ("For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness,... evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment."). The legislature's use of "shall" ordinarily signals a mandatory
intent. Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Berhsad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998);
Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 387(2000); In re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Maria, 186
F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1997);
Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 1997); Association of Civilian
Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter Number 29 v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,
22 F.3d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989
F.2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1993); Mallory v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 601(S.D. W. Va. 1999); United States v. Davis, 801 F. Supp. 581 (M.D. Ala. 1992);
United States v. McKenna, 791 F. Supp. 1101, 1109 (E.D. La. 1992); Forster v.
Superior Court, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (1992); Horsemen's Benevolent &
Protective Ass'n v. Valley Racing Ass'n, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 709 (1992); People
v. Heisler, 237 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1987); People v. Stephen, 227 Cal. Rptr. 380(1986); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
158. See Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 21, 29 (1974).
159. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 57, at 255.
160. Id.
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to introduce relevant specific contradiction evidence is subject
to Rule 403.
Outside of this exceptional situation, under the curative
admissibility doctrine the party does not have a full-fledged
right to introduce the rebuttal evidence. Instead, the decision
is entrusted to the judge's discretion. Again, when the Lala
court stated its conception of curative admissibility, the court
asserted that "when [the opponent] introduces inadmissible
evidence.., the trial court may allow the adverse party to
offer otherwise inadmissible evidence on the same subject."''
The courts typically describe the doctrine as a conferral of
discretion on the trial judge rather than the grant of a right
to the party.16 In short, while a party's entitlement to resort
to specific contradiction is not absolute, that entitlement is a
stronger claim than the party's right to urge the trial judge to
invoke curative admissibility. The entitlement to specifically
contradict the opponent's evidence is a presumptive right
subject only to Rule 403 balancing. In the final analysis, the
"entitlement" to invoke curative admissibility is merely an
opportunity to appeal to the judge's discretion.
2. The Nature of the Trial Judge's Discretion
The preceding subsection suggests an even more
fundamental difference between the very nature of the
judicial discretion exercised under the specific contradiction
and curative admissibility doctrines. The judge's power
under specific contradiction is narrow and negative while his
or her power under curative admissibility is broader and
affirmative in character.
Specific contradiction impeachment is subject only to the
trial judge's discretion under Rule 403. That discretion is a
limited power to exclude otherwise relevant and admissible
evidence.'63 If the party's evidence satisfies the foundational
requirements for specific contradiction, the party has a
161. Lala v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 804, 807-08 (Iowa 1988).
162. See Ryan v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 96 F.3d 1076, 1082 n.1 (8th Cir.
1996) ("a court may permit"); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1225 (2d Cir.
1992) ("The concept... gives the trial court discretion."); United States v.
Nardi, 633 F.2d 972 (1st Cir. 1980); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d 389 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1969); Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 87 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1935).
163. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note; 1 COURTROOM
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 95, § 313, at 89 n.48.
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presumptive right to introduce the evidence. At the first step
of analysis, the judge's narrow role is to determine whether
the party has laid a proper foundation for specific
contradiction. 1 4 If so, the only other constraint is the judge's
negative power to exclude on the ground of one of the policy
considerations enumerated in Rule 403.
Under the curative admissibility doctrine, the trial judge
enjoys a much broader type of discretion. The discretion is
affirmative in nature. In this setting the party has neither
an absolute nor a presumptive right to introduce otherwise
inadmissible evidence. Rather, the trial judge has a
discretion to decide whether to permit the party to do So.
3. The Factors Informing the Exercise of the Trial
Judge's Discretion
A party's right to specifically contradict is qualified by a
trial judge's discretionary power to exclude under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403. That power, though, is limited. Rule
403 specifies the types of probative dangers which the judge
may weigh as considerations countervailing against the
probative worth of the evidence: "the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." 66  The common
denominator of the specified dangers is that they pose the
risk that the trier of fact will fall into inferential error. 167 As
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403 explains, in the
text of the rule "prejudicial" denotes the realistic tendency of
a technically relevant item of evidence to tempt the jury to
decide the case on an improper, usually emotional, basis.'68
Similarly, when the judge's realistic assessment is that the
evidence would tend to confuse or mislead the jury, the
admission of the evidence could cause erroneous fact-finding.
In short, the judge may exercise the discretion qualifying the
164. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 151-53 (4th
ed. 1998).
165. See Ryan, 96 F.3d at 1082 n.1 ("a court may permit"); Rea, 958 F.2d at
1225 ("The concept. . . gives the trial court discretion."); Nardi, 633 F.2d at 972;
Grist, 168 N.W.2d at 389; Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 87 S.W.2d at 537.
166. FED. R. EVID. 403.
167. See generally Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude
Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59 (1984).
168. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
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party's right to specifically contradict only for the limited
purpose of preventing the jury from committing a cognitive or
reasoning error.'69
Contrast the discretion wielded by the trial judge under
the curative admissibility doctrine with the judge's discretion
under specific contradiction. The most salient distinction
between curative admissibility and specific contradiction fact
patterns is that in the former, at least in retrospect, the trial
judge realizes that the evidence previously introduced by the
opponent was inadmissible. In some cases, there may be a
strong inference that the opponent introduced the evidence
with the knowledge or the strong suspicion that the evidence
was inadmissible. For instance, suppose that the party
moved in limine to bar the evidence. Even if the trial judge
elected not to reach the merits of the motion before trial, the
filing of the motion would place the opponent on notice that
there was a serious question about the admissibility of the
evidence. In such a case, the opponent could hardly complain
later that he or she did not realize that the party objected to
the introduction of the evidence. In such circumstances,
when the other party requests permission to resort to the
curative admissibility doctrine, the request gives the trial
judge an opportunity to employ the ruling for a prophylactic
reason and exercise discretion in the party's favor to deter the
opponent from deliberately violating the evidentiary rules
again.
The deterrence factor does not come into play under Rule
403 and is not one of the policy considerations listed in the
text of Rule 403. Arguably, that factor should play a role in
the judge's discretionary analysis under the curative
admissibility doctrine. Suppose, for example, that the judge
found that one party deliberately flaunted an evidentiary
rule, such as the hearsay doctrine, to gain an unfair
advantage at trial. In the pending case, a discretionary
ruling permitting the other party to rebut with otherwise
inadmissible hearsay may discourage the adversary from
further misconduct during the same trial. Thus, the mix of
factors informing the exercise of discretion under curative
admissibility differs significantly from the set of factors
governing the discretion conferred by Rule 403.
169. See Gold, supra note 167.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
IV. CONCLUSION
It is a common complaint that the prose in most judicial
opinions is legalistic and boring. It is therefore
understandable that judges are tempted to resort to lively
language such as "opening the door" and "fighting fire with
fire"'' to make an opinion more enjoyable to read. However,
there is a downside to the use of such vague expressions.
They certainly do not conduce to precise analysis. As we have
seen, their use can generate confusion. Some courts treat the
expressions as synonyms for specific contradiction, others
equate the expressions with curative admissibility, and still
others employ the expressions as overarching umbrellas
covering both specific contradiction and curative
admissibility.
It would be best to altogether abandon these ambiguous
expressions and return to the terms of art, that is, specific
contradiction and curative admissibility. However, even the
abandonment of these expressions is not enough. Damage
has already been done: The boundaries between specific
contradiction and curative admissibility have been blurred.
Hopefully, this article will help reestablish those boundaries.
It is especially critical to sharply demarcate the specific
contradiction doctrine. The right to specifically contradict the
opponent's testimony is an essential entitlement in an
adversary mode of trial. The confusion in the cases does far
more than pose linguistic problems for judges and attorneys.
Worse still, the confusion imperils the adversary process. To
preserve the integrity of the Hegelian dialectic at the heart of
the adversary system,17' the courts must protect the party's
right to attack the opponent's thesis by forcefully presenting
the antithesis. To maintain that integrity, we should bring a
close to the "opening the door" theory.
170. Maguire, supra note 114, at 2321.
171. See 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 5, at 443-46;
DURANT, supra note 4.
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